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FOREWORD 
THE FUTURE OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE 
KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & AARON L. NIELSON† 
World-class appellate lawyers, as a rule, do not downplay 
favorable precedent. Yet during oral argument in BNSF Railway Co. 
v. Loos,1 prominent appellate advocate Lisa Blatt concluded her 
argument to the U.S. Supreme Court with this remarkable statement: 
“I hate to cite it, but I will end with Chevron.”2 “Chevron,” of course, 
refers to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc.,3 perhaps the most cited case in all of administrative law.4 The 
Chevron doctrine is a familiar one: where an administering agency’s 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute is reasonable, courts should 
defer to it.5 In BNSF Railway, that doctrine would have helped Ms. 
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 1. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Loos, 139 S. Ct. 893 (2019). 
 2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 58, BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. 893 (No. 17-1042); see also, e.g., 
Daniel Hemel, Argument Analysis: Hating on Chevron, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 7, 2018, 1:43 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/11/argument-analysis-hating-on-chevron [https://perma.cc/HG8A-
9QQR] (discussing counsel’s unwillingness to push for deference). 
 3. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 4. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1393–94 (2017) (documenting citation counts of several prominent cases); 
Daniel J. Hemel & Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-and-a-Half, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 772 
(2017) (evaluating most-cited cases). 
 5. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
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Blatt’s client.6 Rather than trumpet Chevron, however, Ms. Blatt 
“treat[ed it] as no more than a last resort.”7 
Why did Ms. Blatt “hate to cite” Chevron? Perhaps because the 
Supreme Court has not been very receptive to Chevron deference 
claims in recent years. In fact, the Court has been reluctant to apply the 
doctrine.8 Noting this trend, Justice Samuel Alito has observed that 
Chevron is “now [an] increasingly maligned precedent” that the Court 
feels comfortable “simply ignoring.”9 Two Justices have suggested that 
Chevron is unconstitutional,10 two more have criticized it as 
conceptually muddled,11 and two more still have urged that it be 
significantly narrowed.12 Both the upsurge of “anti-administrativist” 
rhetoric in recent years13 and the elevation of Justice Amy Coney 
Barrett—whose exact views are unknown, but who many predict will 
be less pro-Chevron than the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg14—have 
left some wondering whether Chevron is long for this world.15 Indeed, 
 
 6. See BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. at 908 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“And the Chevron doctrine, if 
it retains any force, would seem to allow BNSF to parlay any statutory ambiguity into a colorable 
argument for judicial deference to the IRS’s view, regardless of the Court’s best independent 
understanding of the law.”); see also Brief for Petitioner at 36, BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. 893 (No. 17-
1042), 2018 WL 3572364, at *36 (claiming Chevron deference for the agency’s interpretation).  
 7. BNSF Ry., 139 S. Ct. at 908 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).  
 8. See, e.g., Babb v. Wilkie, 140 S. Ct. 1168 (2020) (failing to mention Chevron, despite 
disagreement in the briefs over Chevron’s applicability); PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris 
Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2055 (2019) (declining to resolve whether a Federal 
Communications Commission final order was eligible for Chevron deference); Epic Sys. Corp. v. 
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1630 (2018) (rejecting deference where “the Executive seems of two 
minds” because the U.S. Department of Justice and the National Labor Relations Board 
disagreed about how to interpret the statute).  
 9. Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2121 (2018) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 10. See Kristin Hickman & Aaron Nielson, Narrowing Chevron’s Domain, 70 DUKE L.J. 931, 
934–35 & n.15 (2021) (describing suggestions from Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch 
that Chevron violates the separation of powers). 
 11. See id. & nn.14, 16 (explaining that Justices Stephen Breyer and Brett Kavanaugh have 
each offered important conceptual criticisms of Chevron, albeit different ones). 
 12. See id. at 935 (observing that Chief Justice John Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, has 
urged a narrower version of Chevron deference). 
 13. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under 
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44–50 (2017). 
 14. See, e.g., Jeff Overley, Chevron Deference’s Future in Doubt If Barrett Is Confirmed, 
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2020, 11:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1318381/chevron-deference-
s-future-in-doubt-if-barrett-is-confirmed [https://perma.cc/R9SG-VGCP].  
 15. See, e.g., id. (“Judge Amy Coney Barrett’s expected ascent to the U.S. Supreme Court 
would likely propel a conservative crusade against so-called Chevron deference to the brink of a 
triumph . . . .”). 
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if law is nothing more than prediction,16 then perhaps Chevron has 
already been overruled.  
That view, however, is too simplistic. Even if they might 
sometimes do so only grudgingly,17 lower court judges regularly rely on 
Chevron18—and the Supreme Court rarely reverses those decisions. 
Chevron continues to play a significant role in the law, even if it is 
rarely cited by the Justices. Nor is it clear that the Supreme Court is 
looking to toss out Chevron altogether. In its 2019 decision in Kisor v. 
Wilkie,19 a divided Court rejected a chorus of calls to overrule 
Chevron’s cousin, Auer v. Robbins,20 which prescribed judicial 
deference when an agency interprets ambiguities in its own 
regulations.21 Instead, the Court merely narrowed Auer’s scope.22 The 
Court’s reluctance to overrule Auer, a much less important decision 
than Chevron, suggests that the Court may not be inclined to overrule 
Chevron deference outright.23  
So what is Chevron’s future? That may be the most significant 
question right now in all of administrative law. In Narrowing Chevron’s 
Domain, also published in this issue, we predict that the Supreme 
Court will curtail Chevron but not overrule it.24 We also offer the 
 
 16. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897) 
(“The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force 
through the instrumentality of the courts.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the Bench: A 
Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1298, 1302 
(2018) (explaining that outside of the D.C. Circuit, federal appellate judges generally “are not 
fans of Chevron”). 
 18. See, e.g., Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1268 (9th Cir. 2020) (“We conclude that we 
must defer to the SSA’s intervening interpretation of the statute, which is a reasonable one.”); 
Santana v. Barr, 975 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir. 2020) (deferring to the Board of Immigration Appeals 
under the Chevron standard); Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit 
Courts, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2017) (reviewing 2,272 decisions and concluding that “agencies 
won significantly more in the circuit courts when Chevron deference applied”). 
 19. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). 
 20. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). 
 21. Id. at 461 (stating that an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is “controlling 
unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” and citing cases). 
 22.  See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414 (“We take the opportunity to restate, and somewhat expand 
on, [Auer’s limiting] principles here to clear up some mixed messages we have sent.”). 
 23. That said, a cryptic statement from the Chief Justice—whose vote was necessary to save 
even a weakened version of Auer deference in Kisor—arguably suggests some willingness to 
revisit Chevron itself. See id. at 2425 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part) (“Issues surrounding 
judicial deference to agency interpretations of their own regulations are distinct from those raised 
in connection with judicial deference to agency interpretations of statutes . . . . I do not regard the 
Court’s decision today to touch upon the latter question.”). 
 24. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 996–98. 
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Justices what we believe is a coherent path forward. The Court should 
hold that Chevron only applies in the rulemaking context and not to 
agency interpretations announced through agency adjudications.25 
Limiting Chevron’s scope in this way would be more faithful to the 
underlying theoretical justifications for Chevron deference in the first 
place.26 It also would put a stop to the unfair retroactivity that 
motivates some of the sharpest criticisms of Chevron and cut off the 
opportunity for some agencies to bootstrap their way into Chevron 
deference through their procedural choices.27 We agree with Justice 
Neil Gorsuch, for example, that allowing agencies to change the law 
retroactively by means of Chevron deference for agency adjudications 
should stop.28 Nor, in our view, is stare decisis quite the obstacle to such 
reform that one might think. After all, the instances in which the Court 
has deferred under Chevron overwhelmingly have arisen in the context 
of rulemaking—including but by no means limited to Chevron itself—
and the Court’s “precedent on precedent” from cases like Kisor and 
Mead29 recognizes that stare decisis has less force when it comes to 
decisions curtailing deference short of overruling it.30  
We do not have a monopoly on wisdom, however, much less a 
crystal ball. A topic as important as judicial deference to administrative 
action will always be the launching pad for new thinking and debate. 
Accordingly, it is appropriate that this year’s Symposium addresses the 
future of Chevron from a number of different perspectives.  
Professor Thomas Merrill—who himself has played an outsized 
role in Chevron’s development31—sets the stage by positing a 
distinction between the “Chevron decision” and the “Chevron 
doctrine.”32 As he puts it, Chevron itself was rightly decided, but it is a 
mistake to turn Chevron into “a mechanical doctrine that fails to reflect 
 
 25. See id. at 964.  
 26. See id. at 964–80. 
 27. See id. at 938.  
 28. See id. at 963 (discussing Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 
2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)). 
 29. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
 30. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 992.  
 31. See, e.g., Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2433 n.49 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) 
(citing Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1085–86 (1997)); Mead, 533 U.S. at 230 n.11 (2001) (citing Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001)); Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 
187 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 1023 (1992)). 
 32. See Thomas W. Merrill, Re-Reading Chevron, 70 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1154 (2021).  
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the broader traditions of administrative law.”33 Instead, Merrill 
advocates reframing Chevron deference around rule-of-law, 
constitutional, accountability, and process values.34 Focusing on those 
values, in his view, would create a doctrine that better accords with the 
judiciary’s proper role.35 According to Merrill, moreover, the actual 
Chevron decision—with the exception of a pair of “provocative” 
paragraphs—supports this more nuanced approach.36 Notably, 
Merrill’s concern with how Chevron has evolved since 1984 accords 
with recent remarks from Judge Lawrence Silberman, one of 
Chevron’s earliest defenders,37 urging a more muscular Chevron Step 
Two to prevent agencies from “exploit[ing] statutory ambiguities, 
assert[ing] farfetched interpretations, and usurp[ing] undelegated 
policymaking discretion.”38 Merrill’s tradition-focused view of the role 
that deference should play in administrative law may also may have 
appealed to the late Justice Antonin Scalia, at one time the Court’s 
most vigorous defender of Chevron39 but also someone who, in his later 
years, began to experience buyer’s remorse about what it had 
become.40  
Professors Elizabeth Fisher and Sidney Shapiro also seek a new 
understanding of Chevron by exploring how Chevron’s critics and 
supporters think about administrative law more generally. They cast 
 
 33. Id. at 1155. 
 34. Id. at 1156–77. 
 35. Id. at 1174–77. 
 36. Id. at 1195. 
 37. See Laurence H. Silberman, Chevron—The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 821, 822 (1990) (“Chevron’s rule . . . is simply a sound recognition that a political 
branch, the executive, has a greater claim to make policy choices than the judiciary.”). 
 38. Glob. Tel*Link v. FCC, 866 F.3d 397, 418 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Silberman, J., concurring). 
 39. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17 (defending Chevron as a background rule of law against which 
Congress can legislate that “is unquestionably better than what preceded it,” given an era of 
“[b]road delegation to the Executive” and “agency rulemaking powers [as] the rule rather than, 
as they once were, the exception”).  
 40. See, e.g., Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 109–11 (2015) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (questioning whether the Court’s “elaborate law of deference to agencies’ 
interpretations of statutes and regulations” is compatible with the Administrative Procedure 
Act); United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478, 494 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part) (accusing the Court of “add[ing] yet another lop-sided story to the ugly and 
improbable structure that our law of administrative review has become”); Adam J. White, Scalia 
and Chevron: Not Drawing Lines, But Resolving Tensions, YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & 
COMMENT (Feb. 23, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/scalia-and-chevron-not-drawing-lines-but-
resolving-tensions-by-adam-j-white [https://perma.cc/A24Z-WJXW] (recognizing Justice Scalia’s 
late-career concerns about Chevron deference). 
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the debate about Chevron’s legitimacy as rooted in a disagreement 
over “whether administrative law is to be the law of public 
administration”—that is, pursuing administrative competence as 
opposed to merely constraining agency action.41 Fisher and Shapiro 
argue that Congress establishes agencies, and agencies develop 
administrative competence, because effective government requires not 
only “the articulation of rules” but also “expert administrative 
capacity” to both “execute . . . legislative mandates” and “articulate 
what those mandates mean.”42 They assert that this understanding of 
administrative competence dates back to the Founding generation and 
Marbury v. Madison43 and that Chevron’s opponents have lost sight of 
that history.44 Considered within the frame of pursuing administrative 
competence, Fisher and Shapiro contend that “Chevron requires a 
judge to assess the nature of administrative competence at both steps 
one and two,” appreciating “that legal questions of statutory 
construction are entangled with understandings of administrative 
competence” and that “understandings of administrative competence 
inform the overall process of statutory interpretation.”45  
For their part, Professors Jonathan Masur and Eric Posner address 
an unintended consequence of Chevron.46 Whereas the Court once 
justified Chevron as facilitating agency policy choice,47 Masur and 
Posner explain that the doctrine is now used to stifle rather than further 
sensible policymaking by manipulating Chevron deference and 
statutory interpretation “to deprive agencies of the power to consider 
certain benefits generated by regulations.”48 In particular, Masur and 
Posner argue that the Trump administration attempted to evade 
statutorily required cost-benefit analysis that could have hindered the 
 
 41. Elizabeth Fisher & Sidney Shapiro, Disagreement About Chevron: Is Administrative Law 
the “Law of Public Administration”?, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 111, 112 (2021). 
 42. Id. at 119. 
 43. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 44. Fisher & Shapiro, supra note 41, at 127–29. 
 45. Id. at 129, 132. 
 46. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around Cost-Benefit Analysis, 70 
DUKE L.J. 1109, 1109 (2021). 
 47. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) 
(explaining that “federal judges . . . have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by” the 
expert and more politically accountable executive branch); cf. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 
2413 (2019) (plurality) (arguing that judicial deference generally allows agencies to better use 
their “‘unique expertise,’ often of a scientific or technical nature” to address “complex or 
changing circumstances”) (citing Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm’n, 499 U.S. 
144, 151 (1991)). 
 48. See Masur & Posner, supra note 46, at 1113–14.  
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administration’s deregulatory agenda by “Chevronizing” around such 
statutory requirements.49 As they observe, strategic use of statutory 
interpretation to evade good-government measures—a process aided 
and abetted by a broad conception of Chevron—raises difficult 
questions. Masur and Posner suggest that it may be possible to find a 
“middle way” that strengthens, or at least retains the current version 
of, Chevron for some policies but restricts the availability of deference 
for others.50 But what if a “middle way” is not possible—for example, 
because it requires line drawing that courts are unable to do?  
Professor Matthew Lawrence similarly addresses a field where 
Chevron may have an unintended consequence: appropriations.51 As 
he explains, annual appropriations “preserve congressional power” 
over agency decisionmaking because agencies will be reluctant to 
depart too far from congressional preferences if they know that doing 
so may result in less money going forward, yet permanent 
appropriations “destroy” Congress’s ability to exercise that sort of 
influence over agency policymaking.52 Thus, to understand the 
separation of powers, one must evaluate the time dimension of an 
appropriation—and this has implications for Chevron. According to 
Lawrence, when courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
permanent appropriations statutes, they further minimize Congress’s 
authority, whereas deference in the context of annual appropriations 
statutes is less problematic because Congress has other means of 
control.53 This dynamic complicates how we should think about 
Chevron, especially the theory that Chevron recognizes and respects 
an implicit grant of power from Congress to agencies. Would Congress 
really wish to reduce its own authority over policymaking?  
 
 49. See id. The Biden administration may also be tempted to “Chevronize” around cost-
benefit analysis, albeit in service of a regulatory agenda. The Obama administration’s regulatory 
agenda suffered significant defeats because of inadequate cost-benefit analysis. See, e.g., Bus. 
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1149–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011); cf. Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 
2706 (2015) (faulting an agency for failing to consider the costs as well as the benefits of its 
interpretive choice). 
 50. See Masur & Posner, supra note 46, at 1150. 
 51. See Matthew B. Lawrence, Congress’s Domain: Appropriations, Time, and Chevron, 70 
DUKE L.J. 1057, 1057 (2021). 
 52. Id. at 1060. 
 53. Id. at 1057. 
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Another increasingly important part of the debate over Chevron 
is the effect that deference has on individual liberty.54 Many think of 
Chevron deference as a doctrine concerned with big business.55 The 
“Chevron” giving rise to the Chevron doctrine, after all, is a global 
energy company, and many important Chevron cases have dealt with 
corporations.56 Thus, for many, the debate over Chevron is part of a 
larger ideological disagreement over the role of private industry in 
American society.57 Yet Chevron applies in a wide array of contexts 
with more individualized and deeply personal consequences, including 
immigration.58 Professors Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia and Christopher 
Walker tackle this distinct question by presenting “the case against 
Chevron deference in immigration adjudication.”59 As they put it, “the 
theoretical foundations for Chevron deference crumble” in the context 
of immigration adjudication.60 Rather than focusing on judicial reform 
alone, moreover, they urge the political branches to narrow Chevron’s 
domain, for example, by choosing rulemaking rather than adjudication 
as “the predominant administrative tool for implementing Congress’s 
immigration laws and for making immigration policy at the agency 
level,” and also “by not seeking Chevron deference in immigration 
adjudication.”61 As Wadhia and Walker acknowledge, the feasibility of 
the latter is hotly debated but seems to be supported by Justices 
Gorsuch and Stephen Breyer.62  
All of this leads to a question: Assuming it makes sense to reform 
Chevron, what role should stare decisis play? In Narrowing Chevron’s 
 
 54. See, e.g., Michael Kagan, Chevron’s Liberty Exception, 104 IOWA L. REV. 491, 495 (2019) 
(explaining that courts do and should apply Chevron differently when “intrusion[s] on physical 
liberty” are concerned). 
 55. See, e.g., Overley, supra note 14 (suggesting that overruling Chevron would “strengthen 
corporate America’s hand in litigation with federal regulators”).  
 56. See, e.g., Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 304 (2014); FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 129 (2000); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 
U.S. 218, 220 (1994); U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 675 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 57. See, e.g., Joshua S. Sellers, “Major Questions” Moderation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 930, 
933 (2019) (linking debates about the proper scope of Chevron’s domain “to the broader debate 
over the legitimacy of the regulatory state itself”). 
 58. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424–25 (1999). 
 59. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron 
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197, 1234 (2021). 
 60. Id. at 1201. 
 61. Id. at 1203.  
 62. Id. at 1240; see also Kristin E. Hickman & David Hahn, Categorizing Chevron, 81 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 611, 642–47 (2020) (documenting the origin and evolution of the debate over Chevron’s 
waivability).  
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Domain, we address this question as part of our broader 
recommendation and contend that our view is, in fact, more consistent 
with the justification the judiciary itself has articulated for deference.63 
Not everyone will agree with our position, however. And, of course, 
other reforms may reject the theories underlying Chevron but 
nonetheless urge retention of deference. Would reform along any of 
these lines be permissible under rules of precedent? Professor Randy 
Kozel thus examines whether a revised version of Chevron is at all 
compatible with stare decisis principles.64 Specifically, Kozel addresses 
“retheorization, or the recasting of a prior judicial decision based on a 
new rationale.”65 The question he addresses, of course, has implications 
far beyond debates about Chevron or even administrative law. But his 
arguments about retheorization and stare decisis are particularly 
important for debates over the future of Chevron and administrative 
law more generally, given the Supreme Court’s expressed eagerness to 
revisit fundamental aspects in this area.66  
Finally, Professor Richard Pierce maintains that the nation’s 
present state of political polarization has thoroughly undermined 
Chevron’s original promise as a sensible standard that “required courts 
to give effect to democratic values in the process of reviewing agency 
decisions.”67 According to Pierce, Chevron’s original appeal resided in 
the Court’s association of judicial deference with political 
accountability—that is, by “anchor[ing] judicial deference to agency 
policy decisions in constitutional allocations of decisionmaking power 
and the basic principles that underlie our constitutional democracy”—
rather than comparative agency expertise.68 Chevron was supposed to 
give agencies leeway to adjust their interpretive policy choices in 
response to public preferences as expressed through electoral politics.69 
But instead of facilitating a sober flexibility, Pierce argues that the 
combination of Chevron and increased political polarity has supported 
erratic agency flip-flopping between policy extremes.70 The resulting 
 
 63. See Hickman & Nielson, supra note 10, at 982–99. 
 64. See Randy J. Kozel, Retheorizing Precedent, 70 DUKE L.J. 1025, 1025 (2021). 
 65. Id. at 1026. 
 66. See, e.g., Aditya Bamzai, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the 
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 166 (2019). 
 67. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Combination of Chevron and Political Polarity Has Awful 
Effects, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 91, 92 (2021). 
 68. Id. at 93–94. 
 69. Id. at 94. 
 70. Id. at 103. 
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legal uncertainty “makes it impossible for individuals, corporations, 
and prospective investors to make wise decisions.”71 Pierce lays the 
blame for this state of affairs squarely at the foot of Congress and its 
inability to legislate, which leaves presidents with “no choice but to 
assert unprecedented power to act in response to serious national 
problems.”72 He offers a few ideas for political reform to resolve that 
problem.73 In the meantime, however, Pierce reluctantly supports 
replacing Chevron with the Skidmore74 standard.75  
In short, Chevron is at a crossroads. Scholars, policymakers, and 
judges are asking hard questions about both the legality and the 
wisdom of judicial deference.76 A doctrine that once seemed sensible 
may have lost its coherence or its utility with the passage of time and 
changed circumstances. The simple conception of Chevron once 
embraced and defended by Justice Scalia and others may have proved 
too simple for an increasingly complex administrative state that would 
leave the Framers “rubbing their eyes.”77 Or perhaps Chevron still 
serves a useful purpose and will merely evolve, as legal standards often 
do. Regardless, it is safe to say that the Supreme Court is thinking hard 
about the future of Chevron. This Symposium should give the Justices 
even more to think about. 
 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 105. 
 73. See id. at 107–09. 
 74. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 75. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 103. 
 76. See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature 
Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 104 (2018). 
 77. City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quotation 
omitted). 
